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Abstract We re-examine the relationship between central bank independence (CBI), prox-
ied by the central bank governor’s turnover rate and an indicator based on central bank laws
in place, and inflation using a random coefficient model with the Hildreth-Houck estimator
for more than 100 countries in the period 1980 to 2005. We conclude that there exists no
general significant negative relation between our indicators of central bank independence
and inflation. Central bank independence has a significant effect only in a minority of the
countries in our sample.
Keywords Central bank independence · Heterogeneous panel model · Inflation · Monetary
institutions · Turnover of central bank governors
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, many countries granted their monetary authorities greater in-
dependence. It is widely believed that central banks otherwise will give in to pressure from
politicians who may be motivated by short-run electoral considerations (Kirchgässner 1983,
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1991) or may value short-run economic expansions highly while discounting the longer-run
inflationary consequences of expansionary policies (Walsh 2005). If the ability of politicians
to distort monetary policy results in excessive inflation, countries with an independent cen-
tral bank should experience lower rates of inflation. Indeed, an important line of empirical
research focusing on the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and infla-
tion, suggests that average inflation is negatively related to measures of CBI (see Cukierman
2008 and Meade and Crowe 2007 for summaries).
To examine whether there is any relationship between CBI and inflation, one needs an
indicator of the extent to which the monetary authorities are independent from politicians.
Most empirical studies use either an indicator based on central bank laws in place, or the so-
called turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors. Legal measures of CBI may not reflect
the true relationship between the central bank and the government. Especially in countries
where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in the political culture, there can be wide
gaps between the formal, legal institutional arrangements and their practical impact (Walsh
2005). This is particularly likely to be the case in many developing economies. Cukierman
et al. (1992) argues that the actual average term in office of the central bank governor may
therefore be a better proxy for CBI for these countries than measures based on central bank
laws. The turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors is based on the presumption that,
at least above some threshold, higher turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower
level of independence.1
In a recent meta-regression analysis of 57 empirical studies we conclude that legal CBI
measures have a negative relationship with inflation in OECD countries, especially during
the 1980s. Furthermore, studies based on the TOR suggest a positive relationship between
this indicator of CBI and inflation in developing countries (see Klomp and De Haan 2010).
Many recent studies on the relationship between CBI and inflation are based on pooled
data. However, Pesaran et al. (1999) argue that a pooled estimation procedure for (dynamic)
panel models can produce inconsistent and misleading estimates of the long-run coefficients.
The aim of this paper is to examine to what extent heterogeneity influences the relation
between CBI and inflation using a panel model with some widely used controls included
for the period 1980–2005. For this purpose, we use a random coefficient model with the
Hildreth-Houck estimator as suggested by Bryk and Raudenbusch (1992) and the data of
Dreher et al. (2008). This dataset comprises information on the TOR for a large number
of countries over the period 1970 to 2005. Estimating a model similar to that of Campillo
and Miron (1997), we conclude that there exists no general significant relationship between
the TOR and inflation.2 This CBI indicator is only significant in less then 20 percent of the
countries. Similar results are found when a legal CBI indicator as provided by Arnone et al.
(2007) is used.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section gives a description
of the methodology and data used. Section 3 shows our results on the relationship between
CBI and inflation. The final section discusses our results and concludes.
1Still, this indicator is less than perfect, as it suffers from the limitation that central bank governors can
hold office for quite some time simply by being subservient to political leaders. Furthermore, causality is
difficult to evaluate; is inflation high because of political interference that leads to rapid turnover of central
bank officials? Or are central bank officials tossed out because they can’t keep inflation down (Walsh 2005)?
Indeed, Dreher et al. (2008) find evidence that high past inflation increases the likelihood that a central bank
governor will be replaced.
2Also some cross-sectional studies using quantile regressions (Koenker 2005) suggest that the impact of CBI
on inflation is not identical across countries (see, for instance, Temple 1998 and Bouwman et al. 2005).
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2 Data and methodology
Most previous panel studies examining the relationship between central bank independence
and inflation use some pooled estimator. However, there are some problems using a CBI
indicator in panel estimations. First, legal CBI indicators are available only for some specific
years, while it is not known what happens with the central bank law in place between those
years. Most studies using panel estimators (e.g., Kilponen 1999; Franzese 1999; Dolmas et
al. 2000; Jácome and Vázquez 2008) therefore estimate the relationship between inflation
and CBI with a non-time-varying CBI indicator. Instead, we use a rolling average of the
TOR over ten preceding years as our CBI indicator. So this indicator varies across time. As
part of our sensitivity analysis we also use a legal CBI indicator as provided by Arnone et
al. (2007). This indicator is available only for two points in time. Using information on the
timing of changes in the central bank law as provided by Acemoglu et al. (2008), we are
able to determine the value of the CBI indicator for the years in between these points.
Second, it is questionable whether a pooled estimator is the appropriate estimation tech-
nique in view of the possible heterogeneity in our large sample. To examine this issue in
more detail, we use the (dynamic) random coefficient model with the Hildreth-Houck es-
timator suggested by Bryk and Raudenbusch (1992) to estimate the effect of CBI on infla-
tion (cf. Han et al. 2002; Burney 1995, 1996; List and Gallet 1999; Garofalo and Yamarik
2002).3 In a random coefficient model (RCM), parameter heterogeneity is viewed as being
due to stochastic variation. The RCM allows us to estimate the coefficient for each individ-
ual country. Using the parameter constancy test, we can examine whether the coefficients of
our CBI indicator vary significantly across countries. If there is no heterogeneity, the esti-
mated coefficients of the CBI indicator should be the same for all countries. In fact, this is
what previous panel and cross-section studies on the relationship between CBI and inflation
implicitly imposed. However, in the RCM both the random intercept and the slope parame-
ters vary around common means. The random parameters can be considered outcomes of
a common mean plus an error term, representing a deviation from the mean for each indi-
vidual country. The random coefficient model starts from the assumption that the parameter
differences across groups are caused by stochastic variation. In other words, the model can
be specified as:
π = αi + βiXi,t + λiCBIi,t + εi,t (1)
where αi = α0 + κ1, βi = β0 + υi and λi = λ0 + ωi .
The parameters κ,υ , and ω have multivariate normal distributions with mean zero. In
general, the model assumes no autocorrelation within the panels to avoid complicating the
covariance matrix. However, to ensure that we get robust standard errors we use clustered
standard errors. We have an unbalanced panel of more than 100 countries for the period 1980
to 2005. The countries included in our analysis are listed in Table 5 in the Appendix. The
variable π is the modified inflation rate computed as p/(1 +p) where p is the price change.
With price increases, the transformed inflation rate takes a value from 0 to 1.4 Xi,t is a vector
of control variables. Our proxy for CBI is the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors.
3One problem with this estimator could be the low degrees of freedom for some individual countries. We
therefore also estimated all regressions as reported in this paper including only countries for which we have
at least 90 percent of the observations over 1980–2005 (i.e., about 85 percent of the sample). The results
(available on request) do not change substantially.
4The transformation of the inflation rate reduces the heteroscedasticity of the error term. In case of price
decreases it ranges between −1 to 0.
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Fig. 1 Distribution of the turnover rate over time (n = 865)
Various studies report that countries experiencing rapid turnover among their central bank
governors also tend to experience high rates of inflation (see, for instance, Cukierman et al.
1992).5 We calculated the TOR using a rolling window of ten years.6 The final term εi is an
error term. Table 5 in the Appendix shows the number of central bank governors between
1970 and 2005 for every individual country. In Fig. 1 we show the distribution of the TOR
over time and across country groups. The general pattern is that since the 1980s the TOR
declines in almost all country groups. However, there are still large differences between
country groups. Countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe have the highest TORs. On
average, the TOR has a value of 0.2, which means that once in every five years the central
bank governor is replaced.
The control variables that we take into account come from the model of Campillo and
Miron (1997).7 We include an indicator of openness, average GDP per capita, an exchange
rate dummy, the average external debt-to-GDP ratio, and an indicator of political instability.
Our indicator of openness is defined as sum of exports and imports in relation to GDP; data
are taken from the World Bank’s 2005 World Development Indicators CD-ROM. GDP per
5We follow most previous studies in this line of research (except for Dreher et al. 2008) by assuming that
causality runs from TOR to inflation. The main purpose of our paper is to show that the standard assumption
in the literature, namely that CBI affects inflation in all countries equally, may not be correct.
6We also experimented with rolling windows of five years, but it turned out that the main results do not
change. Details are available on request.
7Our purpose is not to come up with a ‘perfect’ model. We include those control variables that have been
widely used in the literature, thereby neglecting other variables that might play a role, like government ideol-
ogy.
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capita and the external debt-to-GDP ratio are also from the World Bank. Our proxy for polit-
ical instability is measured by the first principal component of the number of assassinations,
strikes, guerrilla warfare, major crises, riots, and revolutions in a particular country and year
taken from the Databanks International (2005) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.
The exchange rate regime dummy is one if there is a fixed exchange rate regime accord-
ing to the de-facto classification of exchange rate regimes in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005), and zero otherwise. The control variables are entered with a lag to control for the
endogeneity problem.8
3 Estimation results
Column (1) of Table 1 first shows the estimates of the traditional pooled regression without
controlling for country and time effects. The results indicate a strong positive relation be-
tween the TOR and inflation. This finding is in line with the results of most previous studies.
In column (2) we drop the debt variable, which increases the sample size about six times.
The results for the TOR variable remain the same. This is also the case when we control
for country and time effects, although the effect of CBI on inflation is somewhat smaller
(columns 3 and 4).
The second part of Table 1 shows the estimates of the random coefficient model. The
significance of the parameter constancy test indicates that jointly the coefficients are not
homogeneous across countries and that the random coefficient model is the appropriate one
to use. This is confirmed if we only perform a heterogeneity test on the coefficients of our
CBI indicator, which is significant at the 5% level. The results for the CBI indicator change
substantially as it is generally insignificant. This means that we do not find a general relation
between the independence of the central bank and the level of inflation. However, a closer
look at the individual country level results shown in Fig. 2 suggests that in some countries
there is a significant relationship between CBI and inflation. Still, the number of countries in
which the coefficient of the TOR is significant is limited: less then 20% of our sample. Most
of these countries are developing countries. As a sensitivity test, we have re-estimated our
model differentiating between countries that had an inflation rate above 50% and those that
had an inflation rate below this threshold. In both samples, the CBI coefficient is generally
insignificant (results available on request).
As a further test, we have used a legal CBI measure as provided by Arnone et al. (2007)
instead of the TOR. Arnone et al. (2007) provide indicators for about 163 central banks
based on the methodology proposed by Grilli et al. (1991), which distinguishes between
political autonomy (i.e., the ability of the central bank to select the objectives of monetary
policy) and economic autonomy (i.e., the ability of the central bank to select its instruments).
Unfortunately, this CBI indicator is available only for two points in time, namely 1989 and
2003. Using the information provided by Acemoglu et al. (2008) on the timing of central
bank law reform, we assigned values to the legal CBI indicator for the years in between. To
illustrate our approach: suppose that in country A the legal CBI indicator has a value of 0.5
in 1989 and 0.7 in 2003 according to the data of Arnone et al. 2007 and that according to
the data of Acemoglu et al. (2008) the central bank law was changed in 2000. Our legal CBI
measure for country A is then 0.5 until 2000 and 0.7 from 2000 onwards.
Table 2 replicates the regressions of Table 1 using the legal CBI indicator instead of the
TOR. The results confirm our earlier findings. In the pooled model—shown in columns (1) to
8Table 4 in the Appendix gives a statistical summary of the data used. See also Dreher et al. (2008).
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Table 1 Estimation results I—TOR central bank independence measure
Pooled evidence Random coefficient model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade openness −0.0007 −0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008
[−3.97] [−5.53] [2.78] [5.14] [1.97] [1.72]
Income per capita −0.022 −0.019 −0.119 −0.067 −0.033 −0.062
[−2.67] [−6.74] [−9.18] [−4.80] [−0.49] [−1.19]
Political instability 0.015 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.040 0.032
[1.41] [4.07] [4.33] [4.32] [0.45] [0.50]
Fixed exchange rate −0.023 −0.057 −0.055 −0.053 −0.018 −0.014
[−1.46] [−9.47] [−9.13] [−9.08] [−2.13] [−1.82]
Government debt 0.010
[5.36]
Central bank independence 0.215 0.279 0.174 0.099 0.185 0.054
[4.49] [15.47] [8.43] [4.71] [1.46] [1.14]
Number of countries 118 118 118 118 118 103
Number of observations 539 2523 2523 2523 2523 2398
Average time-series 4.57 21.38 21.38 21.38 21.38 23.28
R-squared 0.21 0.19 0.07 0.08
F -test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parameter constancy p-value 0.000 0.000
Wald test p-value 0.027 0.058
Country effect no no yes yes – –
Time effect no no no yes no yes
t -value between brackets
Fig. 2 CBI coefficient
distribution—TOR measure
(4)—we find a significant effect of CBI on inflation. However, when we use a heterogeneous
model in columns (5) and (6), which is appropriate as indicated by the parameter constancy
test, we do not find a general significant relation between CBI and inflation. Again, the dis-
tribution across countries as shown in Fig. 3 suggests that in some countries the coefficient
of the CBI indicator is significant. In this case, the set of countries with a significant CBI
coefficient comprises industrial as well as developing countries. To sum up our results, we
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Table 2 Estimation results II—legal central bank independence measure
Pooled evidence Random coefficient model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade openness −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0007 0.0011 0.0002 0.0003
[−1.56] [−1.69] [3.22] [5.35] [0.32] [0.35]
Income per capita −0.011 −0.030 −0.055 0.055 −0.045 −0.022
[−1.52] [−8.41] [−2.50] [2.35] [−0.65] [−0.21]
Political instability 0.020 0.026 0.024 0.027 0.042 −0.129
[2.21] [4.19] [3.92] [4.58] [0.11] [−0.07]
Fixed exchange rate −0.055 −0.059 −0.062 −0.062 −0.018 −0.017
[−4.25] [−7.55] [−7.63] [−7.86] [−2.12] [−1.92]
Government debt 0.007
[4.38]
Central bank independence −0.079 −0.012 −0.179 −0.121 −0.101 −0.081
[−3.00] [−2.62] [−6.28] [−4.30] [−0.97] [−0.86]
Number of countries 128 128 128 128 128 121
Number of observations 664 2005 2005 2005 2001 1955
Average time-series 5.19 15.66 15.66 15.66 15.63 16.16
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.04
F -test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parameter constancy p-value 0.000 0.000
Wald test p-value 0.040 0.010
Country effect no no yes yes – –
Time effect no no no yes no yes
t -value between brackets
Fig. 3 CBI coefficient
distribution—legal measure
find no general significant relation between inflation and CBI, although for some countries
this relation turns out to be significant.
As further robustness checks we have performed two more sensitivity analyses. First,
we employ a bootstrap estimation. This method replicates the regressions 1,000 times by
estimating them with various subsamples of countries. The bootstrap results for the CBI
variables are in line with our previous findings. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show the
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Table 3 Estimation results III—sensitivity analysis
Bootstrap Developing Developed
TOR Legal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness 0.0008 0.0003 0.001 −0.004
[1.42] [0.10] [1.85] [−0.77]
Income per capita −0.062 −0.022 −0.032 −0.067
[−0.90] [−0.03] [−0.49] [−1.01]
Political instability 0.032 −0.129 0.038 −0.016
[0.14] [−0.21] [0.46] [−0.19]
Fixed exchange rate −0.014 −0.017 −0.016 −0.007
[−2.03] [−0.19] [−1.53] [−1.02]
Government debt
Central bank independence 0.054 −0.081 0.067 −0.014
[0.85] [−0.89] [0.73] [−0.04]
Number of countries 103 121 77 30
Number of observations 2398 1955 1755 509
Average time-series 23.28 16.16 22.79 16.97
Country effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time effect 0.020 0.053 0.13 0.09
t -value between brackets
estimates of the bootstrap regression with, respectively, the TOR and the legal indicator. In
both cases, the results are in line with our previous findings.
Finally, we test for differences between developing and industrial countries. As noted,
previous studies suggested that the legal indicator works best for industrial countries, while
the TOR works best for developing countries (see Klomp and De Haan 2010 for further
details). So, we replicated the last regression of Table 1 with developing countries only,
while we replicated the last regression of Table 2 with OECD countries only. The results are
in line with the total sample results (see the last columns in Table 3).
4 Conclusions
It is widely believed that central banks that are not independent will give in to pressure from
politicians who may be motivated by short-run electoral considerations or may value short-
run economic expansions highly while discounting the longer-run inflationary consequences
of expansionary policies. Consequently, inflation will be sub-optimally high. Indeed, most
empirical research focusing on the relationship between central bank independence (CBI)
and inflation suggests that average inflation is negatively related to measures of CBI. The
aim of this paper is to estimate the extent to which heterogeneity influences the relation
between CBI and inflation. We use a random coefficient model with the Hildreth-Houck
estimator as suggested by Bryk and Raudenbusch (1992) for some 120 countries in the
period 1980 to 2005. We conclude that a heterogeneous model is the appropriate model
for estimating the relationship between CBI and inflation. Our evidence suggests that there
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exists no general significant negative relation between CBI and inflation. CBI has only a
significant effect in less than 20% of the countries.
What are the implications of our analysis? We certainly would not conclude that CBI
is totally irrelevant. Even though our results suggest that CBI may be less important than
generally thought, they also suggest that in various countries CBI is related to inflation. In
our view, the major research question for future research is therefore to determine under
which circumstances CBI matters. In other words, what are the conditioning variables for
CBI to have an impact on inflation?
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Appendix
Table 4 Data summary
Observations Average S.D. min max
Inflation 4436 0.115 0.151 −0.277 0.996
Trade openness 4965 76.014 44.227 1.531 330.596
Income per capita 4314 8.415 1.101 6.116 10.983
Political instability 5296 0.000 0.665 −0.524 17.843
Fixed exchange rate 7488 0.362 0.481 0.000 1.000
Government debt 907 2.227 8.699 −21.249 203.719
Central bank independence—TOR 3442 0.235 0.187 0.000 1.000
Central bank independence—Legal 3318 0.488 0.215 0.090 1.000
Table 5 Countries included in the analysis
Country Year Average TOR Table 2 Table 3
Pooling RCM Pooling RCM
Algeria 1980 0.23 " " " "
Angola 1985 " "
Argentina 1980 0.77 " " " "
Australia 1980 0.13 " " " "
Austria 1980 0.20 " " " "
Bahamas, The 1980 0.12 "
Bahrain 1980 0.07 " " " "
Bangladesh 1980 0.21 " " " "
Barbados 1980 0.17 " " "
Belgium 1980 0.12 " " " "
Belize 1980 0.26 " " " "
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Table 5 (Continued)
Country Year Average TOR Table 2 Table 3
Pooling RCM Pooling RCM
Bolivia 1980 0.66 " " " "
Botswana 1980 0.24 " " " "
Brazil 1980 0.81 " " " "
Bulgaria 1980 0.24 " " " "
Burundi 1980 0.16 " " " "
Cambodia 1985 " "
Canada 1980 0.14 " " " "
Cape Verde 1980 0.09 " " " "
Central African Republic 1980 0.06 " "
Chad 1980 0.06 " "
Chile 1980 0.44 " " " "
China 1980 0.26 " " " "
Colombia 1980 0.15 " " " "
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1980 0.06 "
Costa Rica 1980 0.36 " " " "
Cyprus 1980 0.05 " " " "
Czech Republic 1980 0.25 " " " "
Denmark 1980 0.20 " " " "
Djibouti 1980 0.12 " "
Dominican Republic 1980 0.45 " " " "
Ecuador 1980 0.85 " " " "
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 0.22 " " " "
El Salvador 1980 0.33 " " " "
Equatorial Guinea 1980 0.06 " " " "
Estonia 1990 0.38 " "
Ethiopia 1980 0.20 " " " "
Fiji 1980 0.20 " " " "
Finland 1980 0.17 " " " "
France 1980 0.17 " " " "
Gabon 1980 0.06 " "
Gambia, The 1980 0.19 " "
Georgia 1980 0.29 " " " "
Germany 1980 0.22 " " " "
Ghana 1980 0.16 " " " "
Greece 1980 0.23 " " " "
Guatemala 1980 0.59 " " " "
Guinea 1980 0.20 " " " "
Guyana 1980 0.09 " " " "
Haiti 1980 0.65 " " " "
Honduras 1980 0.20 " " " "
Hungary 1980 0.21 " " " "
Iceland 1980 0.10 " " " "
India 1980 0.30 " " " "
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Table 5 (Continued)
Country Year Average TOR Table 2 Table 3
Pooling RCM Pooling RCM
Indonesia 1980 0.19 " " " "
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980 0.24 " " " "
Ireland 1980 0.15 " " " "
Israel 1980 0.21 " " " "
Italy 1980 0.07 " " " "
Jamaica 1980 0.37 " " " "
Japan 1980 0.21 " " " "
Jordan 1980 0.17 " " " "
Kazakhstan 1980 0.27 " " " "
Kenya 1980 0.15 " " " "
Korea, Rep. 1985 " "
Kuwait 1980 0.09 " " " "
Kyrgyz Republic 1985 " "
Lao PDR 1985 " " "
Latvia 1986 0.29 " " " "
Lebanon 1980 0.20 " " "
Lesotho 1980 0.21 " " " "
Lithuania 1985 0.61 " " " "
Luxembourg 1985 " "
Macedonia, FYR 1985 " " "
Madagascar 1980 0.20 " " " "
Malawi 1980 0.27 " " " "
Malaysia 1980 0.19 " " " "
Malta 1980 0.20 " " " "
Mauritius 1980 0.12 " " " "
Mexico 1980 0.24 " " " "
Moldova 1990 "
Mongolia 1980 0.20 " " "
Morocco 1980 0.11 " " "
Mozambique 1980 0.14 " " " "
Namibia 1985 0.45 " " " "
Nepal 1980 0.20 " " " "
Netherlands 1980 0.08 " " " "
New Zealand 1980 0.15 " " " "
Nicaragua 1980 0.47 " " " "
Nigeria 1980 0.10 " " " "
Norway 1980 0.18 " " " "
Oman 1985 " "
Pakistan 1980 0.29 " " " "
Panama 1980 0.38 " " "
Papua New Guinea 1990 "
Paraguay 1980 0.30 " " " "
Peru 1980 0.44 " " " "
456 Public Choice (2010) 144: 445–457
Table 5 (Continued)
Country Year Average TOR Table 2 Table 3
Pooling RCM Pooling RCM
Philippines 1980 0.20 " " " "
Poland 1980 0.42 " " "
Portugal 1980 0.28 " " "
Romania 1980 0.20 " " " "
Russian Federation 1985 0.51 " " "
Rwanda 1985 " "
Samoa 1980 0.21 "
Saudi Arabia 1980 0.04 " " "
Sierra Leone 1985 " "
Slovak Republic 1988 0.29 " " " "
Slovenia 1986 0.23 " " " "
Solomon Islands 1980 0.12 " " " "
South Africa 1980 0.11 " " " "
Spain 1980 0.14 " " " "
Sri Lanka 1980 0.17 " " " "
Sudan 1980 0.34 " " " "
Swaziland 1980 0.18 " "
Sweden 1980 0.12 " " " "
Switzerland 1980 0.17 " " " "
Syrian Arab Republic 1980 0.24 " " " "
Tajikistan 1985 " "
Tanzania 1980 0.13 " " " "
Thailand 1980 0.31 " " " "
Tonga 1985 " "
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 0.20 " " " "
Tunisia 1980 0.24 " " " "
Turkey 1980 0.30 " " " "
Turkmenistan 1988 "
Uganda 1980 0.19 " " " "
Ukraine 1990 "
United Arab Emirates 1985 " "
United Kingdom 1980 0.20 " " "
United States 1980 0.08 " " " "
Uruguay 1980 0.37 " " " "
Uzbekistan 1990 "
Vanuatu 1980 0.31 " "
Venezuela 1980 0.41 " " "
Vietnam 1985 " "
Yemen, Rep. 1990 "
Zambia 1980 0.31 " " "
Zimbabwe 1980 0.21 " " "
Total number of countries 118 103 128 121
Pooling refers to column (4), while RCM (random coefficient model) refers to column (6)
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